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THE EVOLUTION AND EXTENSION OF THE NEW YORK
LAW OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION*
JAMES L. MAGAvERN**
INTRODUCTION
A s governiental activities have impinged increasingly on private
property values, the subject of inverse condemnation has in
recent ,years received considerable judicial, academic, and legislative
attention.1 Inverse condemnation claims are now generally recog-
nized by the courts where government has been responsible for
physical interference amounting to a taking of private property rights.
Rcently, however, more intensive regulation of land use, both within
the uncertain limits of the police power and by eminent domain
techniques, has led to advocacy of the theory of inverse condemna-
tion for two other purposes: (1) to provide compensation for tem-
porary restriction of the use of property by invalid police power
regulations; and (2) as a technique by which the courts, when con-
fronted with an otherwise invalid exercise of the police power, may
provide compensation for property losses and 'thereby sustain the
regulatory measure as a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
The New York'Court of Appeals has developed a fair and prac-
tical inverse condemnation remedy for physical interference cases.
It has not yet employed a similar remedy to sustain an otherwise
invalid regulatory restriction of property. But, without real examina-
tion of the issue, it has recently recognized a cause of action for
temporary damages resulting from an invalid restriction of property
* An earlier version of this paper appeared at pages 100-19 of the 1971 Report
of the New York State Commission on Eminent Domain and was prepared while the
writer served as Co-counsel to the Commission. The author wishes to thank the Com-
mission for that opportunity. None of the views expressed herein should be attributed
to the Commission. The present paper has been almost entirely revised, especially in
light of Keystone Associates v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352 N.Y.S 2d
194 (1973).
** Member, New York Bar. LL.B., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1959.
1. For a comprehensive review, see A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA INvERSE CON-
DEMNATION LAW (1971) (prepared for California Law Revision Commission). For an
earlier leading article, see Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation, 1966 Wis. L. Rnv. 3.
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enacted with a view to subsequent formal expropriation.2 It has also
attempted to formulate a workable definition of what constitutes a
de facto taking.3 It is the purpose of this paper to trace the history
of inverse condemnation and related doctrines in New York and
to question the direction taken by recent decisions of the court of
appeals.
The traditional condemnation proceeding is a judicial action by
a public agency, or a private entity to which the power has been
delegated, to take private property for public use and to determine
compensation for the taking. The action is brought by the public
agency against the private owner, and the determination of value pre-
cedes the transfer of title to the property. In inverse condemnation,
both the position of the parties and the sequence of the determina-
tion of value and transfer of title are inverted-the erstwhile owner
brings action against a public agency, alleging that it has taken his
property and demanding compensation. 4
In the common law of New York, the term "inverse condemna-
tion" refers to the remedy devised by the courts when the construc-
tion or use of a public improvement is held to constitute the taking
of some right of private property, but an injunction to remove or
terminate the use of the improvement would result in loss of the
public investment that it represents. In such a case, the court will
issue a conditional injunction, to take effect only if the public agency
does not tender to the injured owner the amount of permanent
damages caused by the public improvement within a specified time
limit.5 The effect is to grant the public agency a permanent easement
in the property upon payment of just compensation.
There is no single, settled definition of the term "inverse con-
demnation," nor of a cause of action for inverse condemnation.
Professor Van Alstyne, in a 400-page study for the California Law
Revision Commission, has defined the term as "the name generally
ascribed to the remedy which a property owner is permitted to prose-
2. Keystone Associates v. State, 39 App. Div. 2d 176, 333 N.Y.S.2d 27 (3d Dep't
1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973).
3. See City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895,
321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971).
4. It should be noted that the same inversion exists in the appropriation pro-
cedure by which the State of New York now takes property. See notes 25-37 infra &
accompanying text.
5. E.g., Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936).
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cute to obtain the just compensation which the Constitution assures
him when his property, without prior payment therefor, has been
taken or damaged for public use." 6 This takes in a great variety of
claims. Given the difficulties encountered in attempts to formulate
satisfactory rules, standards, and criteria as to what constitutes a taking
in the constitutional sense, it seems quite impossible to state the
grounds for such a claim in a general proposition that does not beg
the question by incorporation of constitutional doctrines of due
process, taking, or just compensation.7 Generally, though, a claim for
inverse condemnation can arise from two sorts of governmental ac-
tion: physical and regulatory." Physical actions can be intentional or
unintentional; they can affect property directly, by invasion of space,
or indirectly, as the consequence of actions outside the physical
boundaries of the property; and they can amount to an appropria-
tion of the entire property or merely to an injury to or destruction
of some aspect of the property.9 A claim can arise from regulatory
6. A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 1, at 18.
7. See note 113 infra & accompanying text.
8. Inverse condemnation is not, of course, the only remedy available to the
owner whose property has been or is about to be taken or damaged for public use
without compensation. Damages may be awarded on a tort or contract theory; an in-junction may be issued to restrain the action which constitutes a taking; an order
may be issued to compel the public agency to institute condemnation proceedings;
an equitable lien may be granted in the property taken to secure the owner's right
to compensation; or the public agency may simply be ejected. Note, Eminent Domain-
Rights and Remedies of an Uncompensated Landowner, 1962 WASHINGTON U.L.Q.
210.
9. Professor Beuscher identified five types of cases:
1. Governmental action which works a physical invasion of the landowners'
space-flooding, low air flights, etc.
2. Consequences to private rights which flow from public improvement
projects, even though there is no physical invasion of the landowners' space-
change of highway grades, the establishment of limited access on pre-existing
rights-of-way, etc.
3. The extinguishment, without physical invasion, of private rights, by exer-
cise of powers under government contract-for example, seizure of incompleted
articles and needed materials so as to destroy materialmen's liens.
4. Destruction or substantial impairment of private property interests by
regulation without physical invasion, public improvements or government con-
tract action-for example, destruction of air access to private lands by govern-
mental regulation.
5. Those early zoning laws which gave a statutory assurance of compensa-
tion to all persons damaged by the zoning restriction.
Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent
Domain by the Courts, 1968 URBAN L. ANNUAL 1, 2-3.
Professor Van Alstyne has also classified the cases in five types:
1. "Physical destruction or confiscation of private property by government
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action when a police power measure exceeds the limitations set by
the due process clause and constitutes, in effect, a taking of property
without just compensation.
The theory and practice of inverse condemnation have evolved
largely in response to three problems. First, in some states the con-
cept has been invoked to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity when private property has been taken or damaged by a public
agency. The rationale is that the constitutional right to just com
pensation is not within the scope of sovereign immunity. In Cali-
fornia, for example, the law of inverse condemnation is closely re-
lated to tort theory and has developed out of dissatisfaction with the
traditional immunity of the state and its agencies from liability in
tort.10 Second, inverse condemnation has been employed as a remedy
officers in the course of official action deliberately conceived and undertaken
for that purpose with respect to that property," for example the demolition of
a building to prevent the spread of fire.
2. "Physical harm to private property i.e., by actual invasion, destruction,
or appropriation, caused by governmental activity not deliberately calculated
(as in category 1) to bring about the result but rather to achieve some other
appropriate objective, whether or not the ensuing harm was forsecable or a
product of negligence," for example the flooding of adjacent land as the result
of a public improvement.
3. "Financial loss intentionally imposed upon a property owner, with or with-
out physical harm to his property, by governmental compulsion that the owner
use his property in a certain manner, or take or submit to prescribed action
with reference to the property without compensation," for example manda-
tory dedication of land to public use as a condition to approval of a sub-
division plan.
4. "Non-physical or intangible harm to private property consisting of loss
or diminution of value, utility, attractiveness, or profitability, caused by
governmental non-regulatory activity, whether or not the harm was a fore-
seeable or calculated consequence of that activity, or was a product of
negligence," for example injury to residential property by reason of noise
from the operation of an airport.
5. "Financial loss imposed upon a property owner, ordinarily without physical
harm to his property, by government regulatory prohibition against specified
use or development of property," for example loss of market value by reason
of zoning against commercial use of the property.
A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 1, at 77-82. See also Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability
in Damages, 5 URBAN LAw. 25 (1973).
10. See A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 1.
In New York, this relationship between sovereign immunity and inverse con-
demnation does not exist. On the contrary, the legislature has enacted a broad waiver
of sovereign immunity. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (MeKinney 1963). Furthermore, the
court of appeals has rejected the theory that the right to just conpensation is
subject to sovereign immunity. Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 14 N.Y.2d 119,
198 N.E.2d 585, 249 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1964). It seems extremely doubtful that the state
could constitutionally deny any remedy whatsoever for an uncompensated taking. See
notes 45, 84 infra & accompanying text.
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to provide relief to the owner of property rights that have been vio-
lated by the construction or use of a public works project without
requiring removal or termination of the use of the project. As already
noted, the term is used in New York case law to refer to that remedy. 1
Third, inverse condemnation has been employed in a few isolated
instances in other jurisdictions, and advocated more generally, as a
remedy in analogous police power cases to provide compensation for
regulatory restrictions that would otherwise be held invalid as a
taking of property without compensation, thereby allowing the re-
striction to stand.' 2
I. PHYSICAL TAKINGS
A. Development of the Remedy: Procedural Expedience
The leading case in the development of the particular remedy
known as inverse condemnation in New York is Pappenheim v.
Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co.,'3 decided by the court of appeals
in 1891. The construction and maintenance of an elevated railway
structure in the right-of-way of Second Avenue in the City of New
York were held to constitute a continuing trespass in violation of the
rights of an adjacent property owner. If the defendant had not been
vested with the power of eminent domain, the owner would have been
entitled, under then current doctrine, to an unconditional injunction
against further continuance of the trespass. But the court held that
where the defendant has the power of eminent domain
the court may determine the amount of damage which the owner
would sustain if the trespass were permanently continued, and it
may provide that, upon payment of that sum, the plaintiff shall
give a deed or convey the right to the defendant, and it will refuse
an injunction when the defendant is willing to pay upon the receipt
of a conveyance. The court does not adjudge that the defendant
shall pay such sum and that the plaintiff shall so convey. It pro-
vides that, if the conveyance is made and the money paid, no
injunction shall issue. If defendants refuse to pay, the injunction
issues.' 4
11. Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936).
12. See Badler, supra note 9.
13. 128 N.Y. 436, 28 N.E. 518 (1891).
14. Id, at 444, 28 N.E. at 519.
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In Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg,15 a 1936 case, the court of
appeals adopted the term "inverse condemnation" to characterize
this remedy. The plaintiff, a downstream riparian owner, sued in
equity to enjoin the Village from diverting the waters of a creek and
to compel it to remove the dam it had constructed. The trial court
awarded judgment directing the Village to remove the dam unless
it should within four months acquire, or institute condemnation pro-
ceedings to acquire, the right to appropriate the waters. The ap-
pellate division affirmed. On appeal to the court of appeals, the
Village, challenging the form of relief granted by the trial court,
argued that the court should have determined damages by reason of
the permanent appropriation of plaintiff's property rights and pro-
vided that the injunction should not be granted unless the Village
should fail to tender the amount of damages so determined. The
court of appeals ordered that the judgment be modified and remitted
the case to special term to determine damages by reason of the ap-
propriation. It further directed that the judgment provide that an
injunction should issue unless, within a reasonable time fixed by
special term, the defendant should pay or tender to plaintiff the
amount of those damages. In the court's words:
A decree of "inverse condemnation," fixing the amount of past and
permanent damages resulting from the impairment of the riparian
rights of the plaintiff, and granting an injunction which is to take
effect only if the municipality fails to pay such damages, would
furnish expeditious and adequate relief. It is in practical effect the
equivalent of a condemnation proceeding. It would reimburse the
plaintiff for the impairment of her riparian rights; it would permit
the defendant to continue to furnish its inhabitants with water; it
would dispose of the entire matter in the court of equity; and it
would remove the possibility of placing the Village in a position
where it might be at the mercy of an unfair riparian owner.10
More recently, the court approved the use of inverse condemna-
tion as a remedy in an action for ejectment brought by an adjacent
owner, whose title extended to the center of the right-of-way of a
town highway, against a utility company which had installed a gas
15. 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936).
16. Id. at 240-41, 5 N.E.2d at 803.
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main beneath the highway.17 In another action against a utility com-
pany, the appellate division, fourth department, rejected an argu-
ment put forward by the plaintiff that inverse condemnation is avail-
able only to a defendant that has entered upon land under color of
right and should be denied in a case of willful trespass.' 8
B. Extension of the Remedy: Defendant Lacking Power of Eminent
Domain
Pap penheim and its progeny were expressly predicated on the
possession by the defendant of the power of eminent domain. The
decisions were essentially procedural in character, dispensing with the
necessity of separate condemnation proceedings in the interests of
speed and simplicity of adjudication.' 9 In an important recent de-
cision, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,20 the court of appeals has,
however, extended the doctrine of inverse condemnation to a case
in which the defendant lacked the power of eminent domain and
the violation of the plaintiff's property rights was in no way incident
to any public purpose or use. In 1962, defendant began operation of
a large cement plant in the Hudson Valley which accounted for an
investment of $45 million and employment of 300 people by the
time of trial. Plaintiffs were nearby property owners. Complaining
of noise, vibration, and heavy particulate discharges, they brought
action to enjoin further operation of the plant in such manner as to
constitute a nuisance, and to recover damages to date. The trial court
awarded damages to date, but refused to grant injunctive relief, there-
17. Heyert v. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263,
271 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1966). The defendant acted pursuant to a franchise granted by
the town. The court held, however, that the installation of a gas main was not within
the scope of the easement held by the town for a highway right-of-way.
18. Buholtz v. Rochester Telephone Corp., 40 App. Div. 2d 283, 339 N.Y.S.2d
775 (4th Dep't 1973).
19. In Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936), the
trial court conditioned the injunction it awarded so as to allow the Village four months
in which to acquire the necessary property rights by grant or begin condemnation
proceedngs. It was this relief from which the Village appealed, and which the court
of appeals rejected. In Heyert v. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d
592, 262 N.Y.S.2d 123 (2d Dep't 1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263, 271
N.Y.S.2d 201 (1966), the appellate division held that the trial court had no authority
to appoint commissioners to determine value under the Condemnation Law, and
directed that damages be determined at special term. Cf. Mount Vernon Realty Corp.
v. City of Mount Vernon, 241 App. Div. 882, 271 N.Y.S. 742 (2d Dep't 1934);
Star Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Marsh, 133 Misc. 388, 232 N.Y.S. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
20. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
by leaving plaintiffs to successive actions in the future as further
damage accrued. The court also made findings as to the permanent
damages suffered by the plaintiffs, in the total amount of 5185,000,
for the guidance of the parties in the event that they might wish to
settle the dispute once and for all. The appellate division affirmed,
and plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals from the denial of in-
junctive relief.
The court of appeals reversed. It directed the supreme court to
determine permanent damages and grant an injunction with a pro-
vision that, upon payment thereof by defendant to plaintiffs, the
injunction be vacated and a servitude in favor of the defendant be
established upon plaintiffs' land. To reach this result, it was necessary
for the court to overrule a long-standing doctrine of New York law
that, if a nuisance results in substantial continuing damage to the
plaintiff's property, the court will not "balance the injuries" but will
grant an injunction even though the economic harm to the defendant
from the injunction is great.2 '
The opinion of the court, written by Judge Bergan, stressed
considerations of immediate fairness between the individual parties
to the litigation and the limitations of the judicial process. By noting,
however, that the cement plant represented an investment of $45
million and employed 300 people, that it was only one of many
cement plants in the Hudson Valley, and (as was taken to be a fact)
that to grant an unconditional injunction would be to close the plant
down immediately, the court seemed to suggest that it was influenced
not only by the private interest of the owner of the plant but by a
substantial public interest in continued operation of the plant and
others like it. Recognizing that the case involved the public interest
in clean air, the court reasoned that the problem of air pollution
was not suitable for resolution in a private lawsuit, because an effec-
tive solution would require considerable technical research and de-
velopment, heavy public expenditures, regional and interstate con-
trols, and a careful balancing of economic and public health con-
siderations. The court expressly noted that by the limitation of relief
in this action it was not foreclosing other relief in actions by public
health or other public agencies.
The majority opinion cited Pappenheim v. Metropolitan Ele-
21. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
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vated Railway Co.22 as affording "some parallel," and quoted from
Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg,23 but it did not use the term "inverse
doridemnation" and did not discuss the theoretical issues raised by
the present plaintiff's lack of either a public purpose or the power
of. eminent domain. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jasen emphasized
both points and contended that inverse condemnation may not be
used to effect a taking for a private use. Citing the traditional
principle that a nuisance resulting in substantial continuing damage
to plaintiff's property must be enjoined, and growing recognition
6f the problem of air pollution both generally and in respect to
particulate contamination from cement plants in the Hudson Valley,
he considered the appropriate remedy to be an injunction to take
effect, after an 18-month period during which defendant could at-
tempt to abate its' particulate emissions.24
C. The State as a Party: Appropriation and Sovereign Immunity
It should be noted that the "inverse condemnation" cases dis-
cussed above did not involve the state itself as a party. In cases
where the state has taken property for a public improvement without
complying with the statutory procedure, the courts have afforded a
remedy to the owner which is not known as inverse condemnation
but is the practical equivalent. The reason those cases do not appear
as "inverse condemnation," or in any other exotic guise, is that the
State of New York has long employed a procedure known as "appro-
priation" whereby it takes property without any judicial proceeding
jind allows the owner thereafter to prosecute a claim for compensa-
22. 128 N.Y. 436, 28 N.E. 518 (1891).
23. 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936).
24. As already noted, the cases were remitted to supreme court to determine
permanent damages. Four of the seven cases were thereafter settled. The remaining
three were tried on the damage issue, and the trial court determined damages on the
basis of the difference between market value before and after the nuisance. The
appellate division affirmed. In a concurring opinion, Presiding Justice Herlihy ques-
tioned this measure of damages, suggesting that since defendant was given the option
of ceasing operation or paying for a servitude for a private use, the normal assumption
of a willing buyer and a willing seller in assessing fair market value in an eminent
domain case should not apply. He suggested that the case should be considered
analogous to the situation in which a business enterprise must deal with an adjoining
owner to obtain land for expansion. Kinley v. Atlantic Cement Co., 42 App. Div. 2d
496, 349 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973).
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tion in the court of claims.2 5 As compared to judicial condemnation,
the state's administrative appropriation procedure involves the same
inversion of the relative position of the parties and the sequence of
transfer of title and determination of value as does inverse condemna-
tion. Under the current statutory procedure for appropriation, title is
transferred by the filing of an appropriation map in the county clerk's
office.26 In earlier times, however, not even this formality was re-
quired, and the state could appropriate property simply by physical
occupation.2 7 The courts have held that it is not a necessary condition
to either the accomplishment of a taking or the prosecution of a
claim for the taking that the state invoke or comply with the statu-
tory procedures for appropriation. 2
In American Woolen Co. v. State,29 the state changed the eleva-
tions of certain dams in the Oswego River, thereby violating rights
of the claimant to the use of a portion of the flow of the river. It
was not clear whether the violation was of a temporary or perrhanent
character. The Barge Canal Act provided for appropriation of prop-
erty for improvement of the Canal by the filing of an appropriation
map, with subsequent service of a notice of appropriation upon the
owner, and conferred jurisdiction upon the court of claims to deter-
mine compensation. Here, however, the state did not observe any
of the formalities of statutory appropriation. The owner filed a claim
in the court of claims for damages. The issue before the appellate
division was whether the claim should be considered as based upon
trespass or appropriation. If for trespass, the claim would be barred
by the owner's failure to file a notice of intention within six months
after the claim accrued; if for appropriation, the claim would not be
subject to the six-month limitation. Resolution of the issue depended
not only on the facts of the case, but also on the legal point whether
it was possible for the state to appropriate property rights without
25. N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 30 (McKinney 1962). For an account of the use and
alleged abuse of this procedure by Robert Moses, before it was adopted by the state
as its normal method of acquisition, see R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1974).
26. N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 30 (McKinney 1962).
27. See American Woolen Co. v. State, 195 App. Div. 698, 187 N.Y.S. 341 (4th
Dep't 1921). As long as provision is made for compensation and a hearing is afforded
on the issue of compensation, this method of expropriation is, it seems, constitutionally
permissible. See Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919).
28. See cases cited notes 29-31 infra.
29. 195 App. Div. 698, 187 N.Y.S. 341 (4th Dep't 1921).
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complying with the statutory procedure established by the Barge
Canal Act.
I The court construed the claim as alleging permanent appropria-
tion of property rights, not barred by the six-month limitation for
claims in trespass. It reasoned that the state had traditionally been
able to exercise the power of eminent domain by entry upon and
occupation of property without prior notice to the owner, that the
filing of an appropriation map was not necessary to effect an appro-
priation, and that the stitutory provision of a formal procedure for
appropriation and compensation was not intended to deny compen-
sation where the procedure was not followed. Because the facts were
not clear, however, the court remitted the case to the court of claims
to determine whether there had been in fact a permanent appropria-
tion, as distinguished from "temporary, casual, or intermittent" inter-
ference with claimant's rights which would constitute a mere trespass
for which a claim would be barred.
Weismantle v. State30 also arose from a Barge Canal improve-
ment. In constructing a channel in Fish Creek, the state lowered the
outlet of another stream, Wood Creek, which emptied into it. This
increased the rate of flow of Wood Creek and caused substantial
erosion of claimant's farm land, which was located upstream on Wood
Creek. The court of claims dismissed the claim on the ground that
claimant's damages were merely consequential and involved no in-
vasion or appropriation of her rights. The appellate division, re-
versing the court of claims, held that, as a riparian owner, claimant
had the right to the undisturbed flow of the waters of Wood Creek,
subject to the rights of the state to alter it for purposes of navigation
on that creek, and that the state's actions constituted an appropria-
tion of her property.
In Rochford v. State,31 the state, arguing a variation of 'the
theme that there can be no appropriation absent statutory authoriza-
tion, sought unsuccessfully to confine the theory of American Woolen
and Weismantle to cases in which the state was authorized by statute
to appropriate property before filing an appropriation map. In carry-
ing out a grade crossing elimination project, the state ordered its con-
tractor to pave over a parcel of land, thereby physically incorporating
30. 210 App. Div. 608, 206 N.Y.S. 570 (4th Dep't 1924).
31. 153 Misc. 239, 274 N.Y.S. 656 (COt. C1. 1934), aff'd mem., 245 App. Div.
794, 282 N.Y.S. 254 (3d Dep't 1935).
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it in an adjacent highway. Taking the position that the land had
already become part of the highway by user, the state made no
effort to file an appropriation map or serve a notice of appropriation
upon the owners. The owners brought action in the court of claims
for appropriation of their property. The state argued that, if the
land had not already become a part of the highway by user, then it
did not become such by reason of the acts in question, and could not
become so except by adverse possession after the state had been in
undisputed possession for twenty years. Claimants still retained all
of their rights in the land, so the argument ran, and were entitled
only to damages for temporary trespass to the date of their claim,
since there could be no appropriation except pursuant to statutory
authorization. The state sought to distinguish American Woolen and
Weismantle in that, whereas the canal acts authorized appropriation
by physical entry prior to the filing of an appropriation map, the
grade crossing elimination statute applicable to the present case auth-
orized the state to take possession only upon the filing of an appro-
priation map. The court rejected the state's argument. Quoting from
Weismantle to the effect that the state could exercise the power
of eminent domain by summary occupation of land, it held that the
state had in fact appropriated the land in question and its liability
was not affected by its failure to comply with the statutory procedure.
The right of the owner to claim compensation in the court of
claims for a de facto appropriation by the state is now well estab-
lished. Recent judicial opinions deal with such subordinate issues as
the form of the award, the time limitation for the filing of a claim,
the date of valuation, the calculation of interest, and whether the
scope of the appropriation may be modified after the state's invasion
of the land.32 One case may deserve mention, however, because it
illustrates the tenuous character of the distinction drawn by American
Woolen between trespass and appropriation.38 In Di Bacco v. State,"
32. E.g., Leeds v. State, 20 N.Y.2d 701, 294 N.E.2d 446, 282 N.Y.S.2d 767
(1967); Lambert v. State, 30 App. Div. 2d 476, 294 N.Y.S.2d 368 (3d Dep't 1967);
Queensboro Farm Prods. v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 445, 161 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Ct. C1. 1956),
aff'd, 5 App. Div. 2d 967, 173 N.Y.S.2d 263 (4th Dep't 1958), aft'd, 5 N.Y.2d 977,
157 N.E.2d 723, 184 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1959); Rizzo v. State, 202 Misc. 439, 111
N.Y.S.2d 151 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
33. The problem is analogous to the more familiar one of distinguishing between
the regulation and the taking of property when property is viewed as a bundle of
rights. See Michelman, infra note 113.
34. 42 App. Div. 2d 364, 348 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1973).
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the state allegedly entered upon claimant's land to make test borings
for a highway construction project and in doing so caused the loss
of a crop of pepper. More than one year later, claimant filed a claim
in tort, which was dismissed as barred by the 90-day limitation fixed
by the Court of Claims Act35 for filing a claim or notice of intention
for a tort allegedly committed by the state. Thereafter, but within
the two-year limitation for the filing of a claim for appropriation,
claimant filed a claim for de facto appropriation of a temporary ease-
ment. The state moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that dis-
missal of the the first claim was res judicata and the claim failed to
state a cause of action for trespass. The court of claims denied the
motion, and the state appealed.
The appellate division affirmed. It held that the Highway Law
authorizes the state to enter upon property for the purpose of making
borings and other investigations without the necessity of a formal
appropriation, 6 that the state's entry was therefore lawful, that no
remedy was available to claimants in tort, and that consequently dis-
missal of the claim did not bar a claim for appropriation. The court
noted that the Highway Law contemplates damages from such entry
without formal appropriation.37 It may also be noted that the High-
way Law expressly authorizes the appropriation of temporary ease-
ments for highway construction purposes.38 This may serve to dis-
tinguish the case from American Woolen in which the state was also
authorized to enter upon land prior to a formal appropriation. There,
however, the court considered it necessary, in order to sustain the
claim, to find a permanent appropriation, as distinguished from tem-
porary, casual or intermittent interference with claimants' rights,
which would only constitute a trespass.
Although New York has enacted a general waiver of immunity
in damages,3 9 and although this waiver by the state has been held
35. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 10(3) (McKinney 1963).
36. N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 30(17) (McKinney 1962) authorized the state to enter
upon land for the purpose of making surveys, tests, and investigations for highway
projects and authorized the Superintendent of Public Works (now Commissioner of
Transportation) to settle claims for damage up to $500 (now $1000) without appro-
priating the property.
37. But see N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). The statute did not ex-
pressly authorize payment of damages in excess of $500 without a formal appropriation.
38. N.Y. H'wAY LAw § 30(2) (MeKinney 1962).
39. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963).
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to terminate the derivative immunity of its municipalities and sub-
divisions, 40 certain vestiges of sovereign immunity remain.41 In a re-
cent case, Trippe v. Port of New York Authority 42 the court of ap-
peals had occasion to consider the relationship of sovereign immunity
to the just compensation clause.4 3 A number of residential property
owners in the vicinity of Kennedy International Airport claimed
trespass, nuisance, and a taking of their property by the Port Au-
thority in its operation of the airport. The plaintiffs alleged that
since 1947 the Authority had, in effect, used their properties as an
approach area, causing aircraft to fly so close to their houses as to
deprive them of its quiet use and enjoyment. The Authority moved
to strike all allegations relating to claims that accrued prior to one
year before the action was commenced, on the ground that they were
barred by a one-year statute of limitation. The one-year limitation
was contained in a statute by which the state waived immunity and
consented to "suits, actions or proceedings of any form or nature"
against the Authority.44 Plaintiffs argued that, under the just com-
pensation clause of the state constitution, the right to compensation
for a taking of property for public use is not subject to sovereign im-
munity-that they had a right to bring action for the taking of their
property by direct force of the constitution, entirely apart from any
statutory waiver of immunity. Therefore, the statutory limitation
could not be construed as applying to such a claim, but only to such
claims as might be maintained under the waiver of immunity. Ac-
cepting this argument, special term granted the motion to strike al-
legations of trespass and nuisance but denied it as to allegations of a
taking. The appellate division affirmed.
The court of appeals reversed and held that the Authority was
entitled to an order striking from the complaint all allegations as
40. Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945);
Holmes v. County of Erie, 266 App. Div. 220, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243 (4th Dep't 1943),
ag'd, 291 N.Y. 798, 53 N.E.2d 369 (1944).
41. E.g., Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 486, 174 N.E.2d
727, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961).
42. 14 N.Y.2d 119, 198 N.E.2d 585, 249 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1964). But see Key-
stone Associates v. State, 39 App. Div. 2d 176, 333 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1972), aff'd, 33
N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973).
43. See A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 1. As already noted, the courts of a number
of other states have held that the constitutional right of the owner to compensation
for property taken for public use is not subject to sovereign immunity.
44. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7101 (McKinney 1961).
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to wrongs committed prior to one year before the commencement of
the action. The court construed the one-year limitation as applying
to all actions, including an action for the taking of property, whether
or not there would be immunity from such an action absent the
waiver. This statutory construction would seem to be sufficient ground
for the disposition of the case. The court, however, did not stop there.
It further declared that the just compensation clause does not of its
own force override the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that,
absent the statutory waiver, the Authority would have been immune
from this, as from other actions. The court predicated this conclusion
on the ancient distinction between a right and a remedy and the
dubious theory that the just compensation clause recognizes a valid
cause of action but does not require the state to afford any remedy or
procedure to enforce the cause of action.
Judge Fuld, in a concurring opinion, disagreed that a waiver of
immunity is necessary to an action for the taking of property by the
state. However, he considered the cases to be analogous to the ele-
vated railway cases and the damages to the date of the action to be for
trespass and therefore within the one-year statute of limitation. Judge
Van Voorhis concurred on the ground that the limitation applied to
claims for the taking of property, whether or not the Authority was
immune from such an action prior to enactment of the statute.
In its view of the immunity question, the majority opinion seems
highly questionable. Not only does the concept of a right without a
remedy seem logically meaningless, but the proposition that the state
can take property with complete immunity from any action for com-
pensation seems inconsistent with holdings of the highest courts of a
number of other states and the highest court of the nation. The Su-
preme Court has indicated that although land may be taken for a
public use without prior notice or a hearing as to the necessity for
the taking, due process requires that the owner be afforded at some
time, before or after the taking, adequate notice and a hearing on
the issue of compensation.45 Moreover, as will be discussed later, a
45. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Bragg v. Weaver, 25
U.S. 57 (1919). Conceivably, however, the right of the owner, adverted to by the
court in Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 14 N.Y.2d 119, 198 N.E.2d 585, 249
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1964), to sue to enjoin the officials and agents of the state from acting
beyond their constitutional authority could satisfy the prohibition against the taking of
private property for public use, as incorporated in the due process clause. Where the
taking arises from a completed public improvement, however, a conditional injunction
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recent opinion of the appellate division, adopted on appeal by. the
court of appeals, strongly suggests, without citation or reference to
Trippe, that the just compensation clause is not subject to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.46
II. TEMPORARY DAMAGES FOR INVALID REGULATION
The traditional remedy for a regulatory restriction of property
in excess of the constitutional limits of the police power is a judicial
declaration of its invalidity. If the purported exercise of the police
power is held to amount to an attempt to take property for public
use without compensation, the court does not award compensation
and allow the regulatory measure to stand; it simply declares the re-
striction void. When it nullifies the restriction, the court does not
award damages for whatever interference with the use of his property
the owner may have suffered in the period between legislative or
administrative enactment and judicial nullification. In a recent deci-
sion, however, the court of appeals has recognized a right to temporary
damages for at least one kind of invalid statutory restriction of the
use of property.47 Although the issue has not been thoroughly ex-
amined in the light of either precedent or policy, this decision fol-
lowed upon several other recent opinions pointing in the same direc-
tion.
A. Terrace Hotel: Taking a Noncompensable Interest
Terrace Hotel Co. v. State,48 was the first step in this develop-
ment. The Superintendent of Public Works, on behalf of the state,
filed appropriation maps purporting to take permanent negative ease-
ments in lands adjacent to a state highway, prohibiting the con-
struction of billboards within a specified distance of the highway.
The owners filed for compensation in the court of claims. While the
claims were pending, the court of appeals decided, on the same day,
would be required to allow the state (as distinguished from its individual officials and
agents) to make compensation before removal or termination of the public improve-
ment.
46. See notes 79-81 infra & accompanying text.
47. Keystone Associates v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352 N.Y.S.2d
194 (1937); see notes 79-111 infra & accompanying text.
48. 19 N.Y.2d 526, 227 N.E.2d 846, 281 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967).
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two cases concerning the power of the state to regulate billboards. In
Sczlman v. People,49 the court held that the Superintendent of
Public Works lacked statutory authority to acquire easements for that
purpose. But, in State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court,50
the court sustained the constitutional validity of police power regula-
tions imposing similar restrictions against billboards without compen-
sation. Following the Schulman decision, and on the state's motion,
the court of claims dismissed the claims of the present owners. The
owners thereupon filed new claims for damages suffered by reason of
the invalid appropriation proceedings. The court of claims dismissed
the claim, the appellate division affirmed, and claimants appealed to
the court of appeals.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that, in the trial court's
discretion, the claimants might be awarded legal expenses incurred
in' the discontinued proceedings for permanent appropriation, but
that they 'were not entitled to damages for interference with the use
of their lands between the filing of the appropriation maps and the
Schulman decision. The theory on which the court sustained the claim
for legal expenses was that by common law, as well as by certain
statutory provisions, the court might require indemnification for legal
expenses when the taking agency discontinues a traditional judicial
condemnation proceeding. The court found that, in effect, the state
had in this case initiated and then discontinued eminent domain
proceedings, and that the form of an eminent domain proceeding-
whether condemnation or appropriation-should not affect the right
to such indemnification. In rejecting a right to other elements of dam-
age, 'the court reasoned that since, as established by Ashley Motor
Court, the state could have imposed the same restrictions by exercise
bf the police power without any compensation, the interests tempor-
arily taken by the invalid appropriation maps were not compensable
property interests. 51
The court's statement that no compensable interest had been
taken presents some difficulties. It might simply have held that the
49. 10 N.Y.2d 249, 176 N.E.2d 817, 219 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1961).
50. 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961).
51. The court also held that the case did not present a valid cause of action for
slander of title, because there was no indication of malice or bad faith on the part
of the Superintendent of Public Works. 19 N.Y.2d at 530, 227 N.E.2d at 849, 281
N.Y.S.2d at 38.
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appropriation maps were null and void from the outset and that a
proceeding to remove a cloud on title under the Real Property Ac-
tions and Proceedings Law, to which the court adverted, afforded a
sufficient remedy, without regard to the nature of the property inter-
ests purportedly taken by the invalid appropriation maps. Instead, it
treated the invalid maps as having taken a temporary interest-albeit
a noncompensable one-during the period from the filing of the maps
to the Schulman decision (or possibly to the dismissal of the claims
for permanent appropriation). More generally stated, the court ap-
peared to recognize the taking of a temporary interest by invalid
governmental action pending a judicial declaration of invalidity. In
this more general formulation, the court's reasoning would support
an award of damages for temporary interference with property by an
invalid police power restriction. This conclusion is strengthened by
language of the court characterizing police power restrictions of the
Ashley Motor Court type as effecting an appropriation of negative
easements.52
On a quick reading, the reasoning and language of the court can
be taken to suggest an impenetrable line between compensable and
noncompensable interests. This distinction would preclude a legisla-
tive or administrative determination to exercise the power of eminent
domain in order to make compensation for a restriction which could
constitutionally be imposed by exercise of the police power without
compensation. As pointed out by Professor Dunham, 3 the interpreta-
tion by the courts of the term "public use" as equivalent to the same
standard of public purpose, interest, or welfare required for the exer-
cise of the police power has the effect of allowing legislatures to select
between the two powers in the pursuance of any given objective, and
by employing the power of eminent domain, to provide compensation
for restrictions that might be imposed without compensation by the
police power. It would be unfortunate if legislative power to make
such a choice were to be limited by a rigid judicial demarcation
52. "[I]f the Legislature had wanted to, it could have permanently acquired such
easements . . . without paying anything for them at all." Id. at 528, 227 N.E.2d at 849,
281 N.Y.S.2d at 37. "If an authorized appropriation of these negative easements would
not have been a taking of private property for public use without just compensation
• .. the unauthorized nature of the appropriation would make no difference . . ." Id.
at 529, 227 N.E.2d at 849, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
53. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective, 1962 SUPREair COURT
Rv. 63.
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between compensable and noncompensable interests; and presumably
the court did not intend to convey any such meaning. Rather, the
opinion can be read as holding only that claimants had no constitu-
tional right to compensation for the restrictions and the legislature
had not authorized the Superintendent of Public Works to provide
compensation by the appropriation of easements.
B. Keystone I: Nullification of Regulation in Furtherance of Con-
demnation Objective
Keystone Associates v. Moerdler54 (or, for reasons that will be-
come apparent, Keystone 1) is not, in itself, of great relevance to the
present discussion, but it is important to an understanding of two
subsequent cases to be discussed below. Action was brought to chal-
lenge the constitutional validity of an act of the state legislature
which created a private corporation with the power to condemn the
old Metropolitan Opera House. On request and deposit by the cor-
poration of $200,000 as security for damages to the owner in the event
that the corporation should then decide not to condemn the prop-
erty, the act authorized New York City to refuse for a period of 180
days to issue a permit for demolition of the building. The court of
appeals held the act invalid on the grounds that the 180-day freeze
was not within the constitutional limits of the police power, and that
the provision for deposit of $200,000 did not afford sufficient assurance
of recovery of the actual amount of damage that might be suffered by
the owner. The critical factor in the court's reasoning appeared to be
that the restriction was imposed in furtherance, not of police power
objectives, but of condemnation of the property:
The statute was clearly not intended to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare, as those terms are understood.
Since this is clearly and explicitly a condemnation statute, the ques-
tion is to what extent, pending exercise of the power of condemna-
tion, the Legislature may interfere with the rights of property owners
to build upon or improve their properties.
The deprivation here, not being incidental to a lawful exercise of the
police power, is equally unreasonable and constitutes a taking of prop-
54. 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
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erty for which just compensation must be paid if the statute is to be
upheld.
In summary, the statute was not enacted in furtherance of the police
power. It constitutes an unreasonable interference with property
rights for which the State must provide a sure and certain fund for
recovery of the damage which will be suffered. The amount of such
fund must be established through the judicial process, not by the
Legislature.55
This assumes, however, that the police power cannot be exercised in
aid of the power of condemnation. The court quoted from, and relied
heavily upon, Forster v. Scott,50 which struck down an early official
map statute flatly prohibiting development of land designated for fu-
ture public acquisition. The opinion unaccountably ignored the more
recent case of Headley v. City of Rochester,57 which sustained a statute
similar in purpose and effect but providing an administrative variance
procedure to afford relief against unreasonable restriction of any par-
ticulai property. The statute before the court did not contain an
explicit variance procedure s8 but the language of the court appears
broad enough to preclude even temporary and reasonable regulation
in aid of the power of eminent domain. The question remains, there-
fore, whether Headley v. City of Rochester has been silently over-
ruled. This result would be especially surprising in view of the court's
liberal attitude towards the police power in the recent but celebrated
case of Golden v. Planning Board.5 9
55. Id. at 87-89, 224 N.E.2d at 702-704, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 188-190. The court'es
reasoning suggests the distinction drawn by Professor Sax, as a test to determine what
constitutes a taking, between those actions of government performed in its role as the
operato of some public enterprise and those performed in its role as arbitrator among
conflicting private interests: In the case of the former role, compensation must be
made for damage to private property; in the case of the latter role, compensation
need not be made. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yuan L.J. 36, 67 (1964).
56. 136 N.Y. 477, 32 N.E. 976 (1892).
57. 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936). See also Kucirek & Beuscher, Wiscon-
sin's Official Map Law, 1957 Wis. L. Rav. 176.
58. As noted in a dissenting opinion by Judge Desmond, the statute, by use of the
word "may," authorized but did not require the city officials to delay issuance of a
demolition permit. In fact, however, a permit was delayed, and the majority held the
deposit of $200,000 to be inadequate to cover the owner's damage.
59. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
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C. City of Buffalo v. Clement Co.: De Facto Taking Defined
City of Buffalo v. Clement Co.60 is well known for its treatment
of the problem of condemnation blight in urban renewal projects. In
its opinion, however, the court of appeals did not confine its attention
to condemnation blight, but undertook to "consider in detail the
somewhat amorphous and apparently perplexing concept of de facto
appropriations in the hope of clearly defining and firmly establishing
its perimeters."'' 6 Perhaps inevitably, the definition provided b' the
court raises more problems than it solves.
The case arose from an, urban renewal project and was com-
menced by the city in 1967 as a traditional condemnation proceeding.
The owner contended, however, that the property had already, been
taken by the city in. 1963, when the owner was-forced as a matter of
economic necessity to vacate the property and transfer its equipment
and operations to a new site. Accordingly, the owner argued it 'was
entitled to the value of the property as of 1963, and to interest from
that time. The ground for the alleged de facto taking was that, during
the years preceding the owner's relocation, the city had repeatedly
made public announcements that condemnation was imminent. and
advised the owner that it would soon be required to vacate. As a
business matter, the owner was forced to move to a new location,
the property having been rendered unmarketable and useless. The
trial court found a de facto taking as of the 1963 date, and the appel-
late division, though modifying the judgment in certain other re-
spects, affirmed in that respect. The court of appeals modified the
judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the
owner was entitled to a valuation of the property without dinjinution
by reason of condemnation blight, but that there had been no de facto
taking of the property.
The court characterized de facto takings as arising from two
kinds of governmental action: "physical invasion," and "direct legal
restraint."0 2 These were further defined in the only single formulation
in the opinion as to what constitutes a taking: "[I]t is clear that a
de facto taking requires a physical entry by the condemnor, a physical
ouster of the owner, a legal interference with the physical use, pos-
60. 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971).
61. Id. at 247, 269 N.E.2d at 899, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
62. Id. at 253, 269 N.E.2d at 902, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
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session or enjoyment of the property or a legal interference with the
owner's power of disposition of the property."0 3 For a physical taking,
the court further required (though this may be weaker than a "physi-
cal entry" or "physical ouster") "an assertion of dominion and con-
trol"4 or at least "acts which may be translated into an exercise of
dominion and control by the condemning authority."65 For a taking
by direct legal restraint, the court added that it must, by its "own
force and effect, deprive owners of property or materially affect its
beneficial use and free enjoyment."60
By these formulations, the court was explicitly seeking to set
rather strict limits to the theory of de facto expropriation. In terms
of both precedent and policy, however, it is submitted that the court
defined those limits too narrowly for physical takings and too broadly
for takings by legal restraint, and that it was a fundamental mistake
to view (or least to label) excessive legal restraints under the police
power as a form of de facto expropriation at all.
The court's formulation for physical takings would on its face
appear to deny compensation in any case of physical interference short
of invasion or ouster. Did the court intend, for example, to overrule
Weismantle v. State,67 discussed above, in which the lowering of the
outlet of a creek downstream from claimant's property caused erosion
of claimant's farm land?68 Or consider the issue of impairment of
access by alteration of a highway within the original highway bound-
aries. The court of appeals has recently ruled that if the effect is to
render access unsuitable for the highest and best use of the property,
the damage is compensable. 69 Yet it would be difficult to characterize
63. Id. at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 257, 269 N.E.2d at 904, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
66. Id. at 256, 269 N.E.2d at 904, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
67. 210 App. Div. 608, 206 N.Y.S. 570 (4th Dep't 1924); see note 30 supra &
accompanying text.
68. If it is argued that this constituted a physical invasion or ouster and an
assertion of dominion and control in respect to claimant's riparian rights, then the con-
cept becomes meaningless. For, no matter how indirect, any physical interference with
property involves the impact of some physical force within the boundaries of the
property.
69. Priestly v. State, 23 N.Y.2d 152, 242 N.E.2d 827, 295 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1968).
Priestly arose from a partial taking and concerned the compensability of damages to
remaining land. The holding of the court, however, was apparently intended to encom-
pass cases in which no part of the claimant's land is taken, since the court phrased
the rule in broad terms and cited without distinction Selig v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 34, 176
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such action as an invasion or ouster, and still more difficult as an asser-
tion of dominion and control. Of special contemporary significance is
the question whether the owner of property severely damaged by
noise, concussion, and vibration from aircraft using a nearby airport,
but not flying directly over his land, is entitled to compensation on
the theory that operation of the airport in this manner has effected
the taking of an easement in his property. At least in the absence of
a "total deprivation of use," the federal courts require direct over-
flights.70 Some state courts, however, have awarded compensation on an
inverse condemnation rationale.7 1 The question remains unresolved
in New York.72 Presumably the court did not intend to determine
it by implication in the Clement case; but to rule in favor of compen-
sation, the court would have to qualify the rather categorical language
of Clement.
If the test for a physical taking is too restrictive, the test adopted
by the court for a taking by legal restraint is far too encompassing.
The court's formulation requires that the restraint be direct and that,
by its "own force and effect," it "deprive" the owner of property or
"materially affect its beneficial use and free enjoyment." In the con-
text of the opinion, it seems clear that the court was seeking to limit
carefully the scope of the concept of de facto taking; but it seems
equally clear that the qualifications stated by the court are not suf-
ficiently restrictive. Almost any zoning ordinance and many other
police power measures would fall within the literal scope of the lan-
guage used. In one well-known case, for example, the United States
Supreme Court sustained a local ordinance prohibiting continued op-
eration of a preexisting brickyard in an urban commercial area,
thereby reducing the value of the property from $800,000 to $60,-
O00.7 That the court of appeals did not intend to restrict the police
N.E.2d 59, 217 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961), which arose from a change in the grade of high-
way, and other cases in which there was no taking of any part of claimant's land.
70. E.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 955 (1963).
71. E.g., Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
Adoption of the inverse condemnation rationale was predicated in part on the bar to a
tort remedy by reason of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the particular juris-
diction.
72. Cf. Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 14 N.Y.2d 119, 198 N.E.2d 585,
249 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1964).73. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). See also Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). In the leading case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court sustained zoning as a legitimate exercise
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power to the extent indicated by the broad language of the Clement
opinion may be seen in an opinion it rendered the following year in
the well-know case, Golden v. Planning Board.7 4 In a decision sus-
taining a phased-growth zoning ordinance that had the effect of pro-
hibiting ordinary residential subdivision of land until a complete
array of infrastructure and public facilities were available, which
could run to eighteen years, the court wrote:
Every restriction on the use of property entails hardships for some
individual owners. Those difficulties are invariably the product of po-
lice regulation and the pecuniary profits of the individual must in the
long run be subordinated to the needs of the community. The fact
that the ordinance limits the use of, and may depreciate the value
of the property will not render it unconstitutional, however, unless
it can show that the measure is either unreasonable in terms of neces-
sity or the diminution in value is such as to be tantamount to a con-
fiscation. Diminution, in turn, is a relative factor and though its mag-
nitude is an indicia of a taking, it does not of itself establish a
confiscation.75
A more fundamental objection to the court's attempt in Cldment
to subsume police power cases within its formulation of the concept
of de facto taking is that it ignored the normal disposition of a police
power case-a judicial declaration of the validity or invalidity of the
regulatory measure. If the purported exercise of the police power is
held to amount to an attempt to take private property without payment
of just compensation, the court does not normally confirm the taking
and order the public agency to make payment. It simply declares the
restrictive measure void. The effect is not a de facto taking but a n ul-
lification of the restriction, which would constitute a taking only if it
were sustained by the court. Two cases were cited by the court in i;ela-
tion to the proposition that a police power measure can constitute a de
facto taking-Keystone 176 and Forster v. Scott.'1 Both cases involved
of the police power, and sustained a particular zoning ordinance that allegedly reduced
the value of property zoned for residential use to $2500 per acre, as compared to its
value of $10,000 per acre for industrial use.
74. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972). It is interesting
to note that the majority'opinions in the two cases, Clement and Ramapo, were written
by the same judge, Judge Scileppi.
75. Id. at 381, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154 (citations omitted).
76. 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
77. 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
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attempts, by exercise of the police power, to restrict development of
property pending a public determination whether or not to take the
property for public use, and in each case the court held the purported
police power measure void7s In each case the court characterized the
regulatory measures in question as a taking or deprivation of private
property for which compensation must be paid. In the more recent
case, the court expressly qualified that characterization by the phrase
"if the statute is to be upheld," and, in the former case, that was the
plain meaning of the opinion. In short, the effect was not to find a
de facto taking but to declare void an attempted taking.
The court did not cite, and the writer is not aware of, any prior
New York case in which a regulatory measure was held to give rise to
a valid claim for compensation on the ground that it had in effect
taken private property interests for public use. The court's delinea-
tion of the concept of de facto taking in Clement was made in the
context of a determination of the effect to be given to condemnation
blight in the disposition of a de jure condemnation proceeding. Until
Keystone Associates v. State,79 (hereinafter referred to as Keystone I1)
to which we shall now turn, it would have seemed quite unreasonable
to construe it as establishing a new and broadly defined cause of ac-
tion for inverse condemnation in police power cases.
D. Keystone II: Recognition of Cause of Action for Temporary Dam-
ages for Invalid Regulation in Furtherance of Condemnation Ob-
jective
After its success in Keystone 1,80 resulting in judicial nullification
of the statute authorizing city officials to delay for 180 days demolition
of the old Metropolitan Opera House, Keystone Associates Inc., which
held a 50-year lease on the property, filed a claim in the court of
claims for more than $3.5 million in damages for the temporary ap-
propriation of its interests during the period from enactment of the
statute to issuance of a demolition permit. On motion of the state,
78. In Clement, as in Keystone 1, the court failed to cite Headley v. City of
Rochester, which sustained an official map statute regulating development of private
property pending its future acquisition for public use, but establishing a variance pro-
cedure to afford relief against unreasonable restriction of any particular property.
79. 39 App. Div. 2d 176, 333 N.Y.S.2d 27 (3d Dep't 1972), aff'd mem., 33
N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973).
,80. 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
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the court of claims dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter and failure to state a cause of action. Claimant ap-
pealed. The appellate division, third department reversed, and the
court of appeals affirmed on the opinion of the appellate division,8'
both by divided courts.
In its opinion, the appellate division brushed aside any issue of
sovereign immunity as of no consequence in view of the just compen-
sation clause of the state constitution, suggesting, contrary to Trippe
v. Port of New York Authority, 2 that the right to just compensation
is not subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Citing Terrace
Hotel,83 the court characterized police power restrictions as noncom-
pensable negative easements, but cited Keystone I to the effect that the
statute in question did not constitute an exercise of the police power.
As to whether a de facto appropriation can arise from an invalid
statutory restriction, the court held:
Doubt as to whether the trial court or this court could hold that as
a matter of law there was no de facto appropriation is dispelled by
the repeated references in City of Buffalo v. Clement Co. to the
Moerdler case [Keystone 1] as an example of a de facto appropria-
tion. Upon this motion it appears that there was in fact an appro-
priation of property interests necessarily temporary in nature prior to
the final determination by the courts as to the validity of the special
law.84
Finally, the court held the state to be the party liable for the de facto
appropriation, since the power of eminent domain was exercised by it,
whether directly or indirectly.
Two judges dissented on the grounds that the enactment of the
statute was a governmental act for which the state had not waived its
immunity,85 that a void statute confers no rights and imposes no
81. 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973).
82. 14 N.Y.2d 119, 198 N.E.2d 585, 249 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1964).
83. Terrace Hotel Co. v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 526, 227 N.E.2d 846, 281 N.Y.S.2d
34 (1967).
84. 39 App. Div. 2d at 176, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 29 (citation omitted).
85. The state's general waiver of immunity provides:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with
the same rules of law as applied to actions in the Supreme Court against indi-
viduals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of
this article ....
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963) (emphasis added). A line of cases has evolved
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duties, and that it was not enactment of the statute but the action of
the private corporation that caused the damage. They did not con-
sider Keystone I to impose liability on the state, quoting from the
opinion in that case the observation that the legislature was not will-
ing to invest public funds in appropriation of the property.
The court of appeals, as already noted, affirmed on the opinion
of the appellate division. Judge Breitel dissented in a cogent opinion
of three paragraphs.
I dissent and vote to reverse and dismiss the claim for the reasons
stated in the dissenting opinion at the Appellate Division. Moreover,
the analysis by the majority at the Appellate Division and in this
court is based on a verbal non sequitur. The statute held unconstitu-
tional in Matter of Keystone Assoc. v. Moerdler... was struck down
not because it effected an appropriation but because if given effect,
it would have accomplished an appropriation without full compensa-
tion to the owners as required by the Federal and State Constitutions.
Hence, the statute struck down accomplished nothing just because it
was void. To provide compensation in this action as damages in
"quasi-tort" for the aborted "appropriation" would now in effect sup-
ply, judicially it is true, the very defect which made the statute void.
If that were legally possible the statute should never have been struck
down in the first instance.
Beyond the special rules of law governing de facto appropria-
tions by public bodies with power of eminent domain, which does not
involve unconstitutional legislation in any event, there is no provision
in precedent or statutory law for compensating owners of property
because of the impact of unconstitutional legislation. If there were,
the scope of liability would literally be unlimited, when one considers
the innumberable areas of emergency legislation, often of doubtful
constitutionality at least at the inception, affecting rents, mortgages,
legal tender, police power regulation, law enforcement procedures, li-
censing regulation of every kind, and the like.
The rule laid down in this case is not only novel but may foretell
a broad questionable policy of providing a tort remedy for the harm-
ful effects of unconstitutional legislation. One consequence could well
holding the state immune from liability for legislative, judicial, and other governmental
acts which find no analogy in the acts of private individuals and corporations. For an
excellent discussion of these cases, see Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for
"Purely Governmental" Functions, 10 SYRAcusE L. REv. 30 (1958). It should be noted,
however, that section nine of the Act expressly confers upon the court jurisdiction to
determine claims for appropriation of property. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 9 (McKinney
1963).
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be the failure of or the delay in resistance to unconstitutional legisla-
tion until the quantum of damages has increased to make resistance
worthwhile.8 6
Both Forster v. Scott and Keystone I were concerned with statutes
providing for restriction of development of land in order to facilitate
expropriation. In Keystone I, the court stressed the point that the
statute was not enacted in furtherance of the police power but was "a
condemnation statute," and in Keystone II the appellate division rec-
ognized that restrictions created pursuant to the police power are not
compensable but reasoned that, as held in Keystone 1, the statute in
question "did not constitute an exercise of the police power." It is
possible to read this language as signifying not simply that the statute
was not a valid exercise of the police power, within constitutional
limits, but that the statute-was not enacted in pursuance of even os-
tensible or arguable police power objectives and did not even pur-
port to be a police power measure.87 If the opinions may be so read,
the question seems open, though perhaps only barely, whether the
holding of Keystone 1I would extend to a statute enacted in further-
ance of purely regulatory objectives, as distinguished from objectives
associated with condemnation, but restricting private property, either
generally or as applied to a particular property, so severely as to ex-
ceed the constitutional limits of the police power.
E. Objections to Extension of Keystone II
It is submitted that there are strong reasons of policy to limit
Keystone II to statutes enacted in furtherance of condemnation objec-
tives, rather than to create a cause of action for every unconstitu-
tional restriction of property by extending the Keystone rationale to
statutes enacted in furtherance of police power objectives but beyond
the constitutional limits of the police power. The two kinds of statutes
differ markedly in the scope of potential liability they could engender.
A statute in furtherance of condemnation is applied, either legisla-
tively or administratively, to particular, identified property; and lia-
bility is consequently limited to damage to that property. In contrast,
86. 33 N.Y.2d 848, 850, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (1973) (Breitel,
J., dissenting).
87. Cf. note 55 supra (the distinction drawn by Professor Sax between the enter.
prise and arbitration roles of government).
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a statute in furtherance of police power objectives can affect indefinite
classes of property such as the personal and intangible property of
such enterprises as the major automobile, oil, steel, and chemical
producers; and the scope of liability for such a statute would be vir-
tually boifndless. 88 For example, consider the impact of price and rent
controls, food and drug regulations, pollution emission controls, Ianti-
trust and trade regulations, and land use controls. Moreover, whereas
in the case of a statute in furtherance of condemnation, the legislature
(or possibly an administrative agency, pursuant to a legislative delega-
tion) will have made at least a tentative determination that it may be
in the public interest to acquire and pay for the property, no such
determination will have been made in the enactment of the ordinary
police power statute.
The possibility that such open-ended liability could inhibit en-
actment of legislation in the public interest seems more than remote
and negligible. A recent study indicates that, even without the prospect
of financial liability, the adoption of badly needed environmental con-
trols has been unduly impeded by fear of litigation and judicial nulli-
fication on due process and just compensation grounds.8 9 This inhibi-
ting effect would be especially acute in cases of emergency legislation,9
and particularly difficult to overcome in the majority of jurisdictions
which do not provide for advisory opinions.9' Such liability might not
only inhibit legislatures from enacting borderline but constitutionally
valid legislation to meet emerging problems, but it might also retard
resistance to invalid legislation: "a regulation should be tested as a
regulation, in the atmosphere that produced it";92 "the best way of
guarding against arbitrary exercise of governmental power is to en-
courage those injured to block it at its inception, rather than to grant
compensation after the unlawful act has been consummated."9 3
Since Keystone II and the relevant dicta of Clement and Keystone
I are predicated on the just compensation clause, it would seem that
88. See dissenting opinion of Judge Breitel, supra note 86; Beuscher, supra note 9.
89. See F. BOSSELMAN, P. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAinG IssuE (1973).
90. See dissenting opinion of Judge Breitel, supra note 86.
91. This difficulty is mitigated by the fact that a majority of the states have en-
acted statutes providing for declaratory judgments. 3 W. ANDERSEN, ACTIONS FOR Dzo
OLATORY JUDGMENTS 597-612 (Supp. 1959).
92. See Beuscher, supra note 9.
93. 66 HAuv. L. Rsv. 1134, 1135 (1953). See also dissenting opinion of Judge
Breitel, supra note 86.
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if a cause of action for invalid police power restrictions of property
is to be recognized, it is only for restrictions held invalid on constitu-
tional grounds. This could lead to some quite arbitrary distinctions,
a great deal of uncertainty, and considerable pressure on public
agencies, and perhaps courts, to maneuver to cast litigation and deci-
sions in nonconstitutional terms. The court of appeals has stated, for
example, that the delegation of zoning power in New York's Zoning
Enabling Act is not coextensive with the general police power pur-
poses recited at the outset of the Act, but is limited by the subsequent
statement of more specific objectives. 4 If a zoning measure is held
invalid as not in accordance with a comprehensive plan or beyond the
scope of the delegation of power to the municipality, without tech-
nically reaching a nearly identical due process question, would the
affected property owner miss out on a cause of action for temporary
damages?95 What would be the result if an administrative hearing were
interposed between the statute and its application to any particular
property in the form of a permit or variance procedure? Would
this limit the owner to relief in an Article 78 proceeding and
94. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138 (1972); cf. Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d
424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969). The zoning enabling act recites at the
beginning of its general grant of zoning power "the purpose of promoting the health,
safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community." N.Y. TowN LAw § 261
(McKinney 1965). However, it goes on to direct that:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan de-
signed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, flood,
panic and other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to provide
adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue
concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transpor-
tation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements. Such
regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as
to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses,
and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.
Id. § 263; see N.Y. CONST., art. 9, § 2(c) (10), which empowers local governments to
enact local laws, not inconsistent with state law, for "the government, protection, order,
conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein." There would
seem to be no reason why zoning and other regulations could not be consolidated in
a single local law or ordinance, as long as the zoning provisions did not contravene
positive conditions and limitations established by the zoning enabling act.
95. In Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424,
244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969), and Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235
N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968), for example, zoning restrictions were held
invalid on the alternative grounds that they were not within the bounds of the zoning
enabling act and that they would constitute a taking of property without just compensa-
tion.
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deprive him of any cause of action for interference with the use of
his property pending a final judicial resolution of the Article 78 pro-
ceeding, which might very well overturn the restriction on constitu-
tional or closely related grounds, delaying development of the prop-
erty for a longer period of time than in the case of a simple legal
attack on the statute on its face?96 If the answer were in the affirma-
tive, not only would the distinction between compensable and non-
compensable interference seem arbitrary, but legislative draftsmen
would be strongly tempted to provide variance procedures and estab-
lish bureaucracies to run them whether or not this were deemed wise
and useful as a matter of public administration.
Finally, a cause of action for damages for unconstitutional police
power legislation is (or was) entirely unprecedented in New 'York
law.97 A decision to create such a cause of action is a decision- as to
the distribution of significant public funds. In the context of current
perceptions as to the identity and nature of the most urgent needs for
more intensive public regulation, it may be expected that the princi-
pal beneficiaries of such a decision would be the owners of undevel-
oped land and, if the cause of action were extended to business regu-
96. Cf. Old Farm Road, Inc. v. Town of New Castle, 26 N.Y.2d 462, 259 N.E.2d
920, 311 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1970); Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d
198 (1936). In Jayne Estates v. Raynor, 22 N.Y.2d 417, 425, 239 N.E.2d 713, 717,
293 N.Y.S.2d 75, 81 (1968), the court stated that a showing of unique circumstances
is not required for a zoning variance where the landowner has made the requisite
showing of financial hardship and compatibility with the existing land use pattern,
observing that
[t]o deny the variance solely on the ground that "unique circumstances" had
not been shown leaves open the prospect of a successful assault on the zoning
ordinance as being confiscatory . . . . [A] variance, wisely used, provides local
zoning officials with an excellent means by which they can accomodate a con-
ffict between the requirements of a generally sound zoning ordinance and the
needs of a particular situation.
In Ton-Da-Lay, Ltd. v. Diamond, 44 App. Div. 2d 430, 355 N.Y.S.2d 820 (3d Dep't
1974), the court overturned several determinations made by the Commissioner of En-
vironmental Conservation in an administrative proceeding for approval of elements of a
large development project in Adirondack Park. The court did not rest its decision on
constitutional grounds, but it is not difficult to envisage a "taking" issue in this context.
The court also sustained the Commissioner's determination requiring the developer to
submit further evidence on certain issues, and ultimate determination of the case will
undoubtedly take far more time than the eight months that elapsed in Keystone I
between the date on which the owner applied for a building permit and the legislature
passed the statute (these occurred on the same day), and the date on which the permit
was issued, following the court of appeals decision nullifying the statute.
97. For a survey of developments in other jurisdictions, see Badler, supra note- 9.
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lation, heavy industry and mass producers of consumer goods.-, In a
time when the wealth, income, and welfare of nearly every member
of society is directly and significantly affected by governmental poli-
cies, and many other groups are affected far more adversely by the
totality of such policies and actions, it may be asked whether the own-
ers of undeveloped land and big business should be accorded priority
for an additional claim on public funds.
III. INVERSE CONDEMNATION TO SUSTAIN OTHERWISE
INVALiD RESTRCTION
A. Examples
In a few isolated cases in other jurisdictions, the rationale of in-
verse condemnation has been employed to compensate the owner for
permanent damages resulting from what would otherwise be an un-
constitutional regulatory restriction of private property. The best
known of such cases is Bydlon v. United States.99 Plaintiffs were the
owners of a private recreational resort located in a national forest, ac-
cessible principally by air. In order to preserve the wild character of
the forest and to discourage use of private resorts located within it,
the government issued an order prohibiting flight over the forest at
an altitude below 400 feet. The effect of the order was to impair dras-
tically plaintiffs' access to their property and to destroy its profita-
bility as a resort. After unsuccessfully attempting to enjoin enforce-
ment of the order, plaintiffs sued in the United States Court of Claims
for the taking of their right of access by air. The court found a taking
and awarded plaintiffs compensation for the reduction in the value of
their properties by reason of the loss of rights of access.
Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood,100 a New Jersey case, did
not involve permanent damages, since the restriction in question was
by its terms effective for only one year. It employed, however, an in-
verse condemnation rationale to sustain the restriction, and that same
98. Perhaps, to the extent that legislatures might be inlbited by such a cause of
action, somewhat lower prices might be passed on to purchasers. Perhaps, in some cir-
cumstances a portion of damage recoveries would be passed on in the form of lower
prices.
99. 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959). See also Peacock v. County of Sacramento,
271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (3d Dist. 1969).
100. 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968).
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rationale might well be extended to cases concerning permanent re-
strictions. A landowner brought suit to test the constitutionality, of. an
official map statute authorizing municipalities to reserve land for fu-
ture public use by prohibiting development for one year. Referring
to the presumption of constitutionality and the presumption that the
legislature acts with principles of constitutional law in mind, the court
sustained the statute by finding an implied statutory duty on the part
of the municipality to compensate the owner for the temporary, re-
striction of the property. In anticipation of further proceedings, the
court laid down guidelines for the determination of fair compensation.
B. Objections
This form of relief for an unconstitutional restriction of property
is subject to most of the objections stated above in relation to com-
pensation for temporary damages, and to still more serious objections.
Permanent damages, in most cases, would be considerably greater in
amount than temporary damages, and the inhibiting effect on tle
enactment of legislation would be correspondingly more severe. The
creation of property interests in this manner could give rise to prob-
lems of notice, recording, and conveyanceing.110 Subsequent amend-
ment or repeal of the regulatory measure, eventually all but inevitable,
would be complicated by problems of adjustment of property interests
and compensation, especially when government sought to effect a
forcible reconveyance of the interest back upon an unwilling fee
owner.102 Most important, the appropriate body to make the de-
termination, following a judicial determination of the invalidity of
a regulatory measure, whether to pay the price of maintaining it by
exercise of the power of eminent domain, to abandon it, or to devise
some other means to the same legislative end, is not a court but the
legislative body or administrative agency pursuant to a legislative
101. See Beuscher, supra note 9, at 3, 12.
102. See id. at 4, 12-13. For example, in In re Third Ave. R.R. Bridge, 21 N.Y.2d
293, 234 N.E.2d 445, 287 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1967), the City of New York condemned
property it already owned (quasi-easements of light and air originally acquired by the
railroad company from the adjacent fee owners by inverse condemnation and subse-
quently purchased by the city), as a means to recover a part of their value from
adjacent owners by special assessment. The case raised intriguing issues as to the appli-
cability of the normal rules for measuring compensation when the positions of the
parties are reversed, and government is not taking property from an unwilling seller but
conveying it to an unwilling purchaser.
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delegation of power. When other, traditional forms of relief are avail-
able, with a more limited impact upon public policy, a court has
neither a legitimate role nor the decision-making means to consider
the costs and benefits of such a determination in relation to available
resources and competing public needs. The legislative body, more-
over, can consider the full range of alternative means to the legisla-
tive end, including less restrictive police power measures, tax measures,
acquisition of the property in fee, and other forms of regulatory ease-
ments. If expropriation of regulatory easements is ultimately chosen,
the legislature can establish a program for all of the properties af-
fected and provide for the recording and subsequent alteration and
release of the interests to be acquired.
C. Alternative: Conditional Remedy
In recognition that modem land-use planning cannot function
effectively within the constitutional limits of the police power, com-
pensable regulation (the expropriation of regulatory easements), has
been proposed to achieve a number of planning objectives: preserva-
tion of landmarks, historical sites and open space; reservation of land
for future public use; and detailed, highly restrictive control over de-
velopment. 10 3 Since it is often uncertain at the time a regulation is
enacted whether it will effect (or whether it will be held to effect) a
taking of property in the constitutional sense, inverse condemnation
has been proposed as a means to reconcile the regulatory objective with
103. See MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 4-205 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1973);
D. MANDELKER, MANAoING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 860-74 (lst ed. 1971); Kras-
nowiecki & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 179 (1961); Mandelker, Notes from the English, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (1961);
Comment, Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 611 (1970);
Comment, Landmark Preservation Laws, 35 U. Cix. L. REV. 362 (1968). In the early
days of zoning, Minnesota employed a compensatory zoning technique which blended
the police power, the taxing power, and the power of eminent domain. See State ex
rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920).
Recently, the use of a similar technique by Kansas City has been sustained by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court. See City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
More recently, a technique known as "transfer of development rights" has been
devised to provide to a limited extent for compensatory adjustment within the private
market for the effect of planning controls that shift value from some sites to others.
If successful and if extended to a wide variety of planning objectives and controls,
this technique would obviate many of the problems associated with inverse condemna-
tion of regulatory easements. See J. CosToNsS, SPACE ADRIFT (1974); cf. Marcus,
Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Man-
hattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1974).
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the constitutional imperative of just compensation by sustaining the
regulation upon payment for a regulatory easement. The draft Land
Use & Development Planning Law prepared by the former New York
State Office of Planning Coordination and the Joint Legislative Com-
mittee on Metropolitan and Regional Areas provided:
If a court finds that any restriction imposed pursuant to this article
promotes the public health, safety and welfare but amounts to a tak-
ing of private property the court may sustain the restriction on con-
dition that the governing body provide just compensation for such
taking. In such case the taking shall be deemed the condemnation
of an interest in land for a public purpose for which public funds may
be expended. The resulting public interest shall be deemed an in-
terest in land which shall be recorded and any future conveyance
shall be made subject to such public interest. In no case shall com-
pensation be paid for the creation of a restriction imposed upon land
use or development which preexisting natural or man-made condi-
tions existing prior to the creation of the restriction require to ensure
public safety, welfare and health.10 4
Similarly, the tentative draft of the American Law Institute Model
Land Development Code authorizes the court, upon finding a rule or
ordinance invalid, to stay entry of an order for up to 90 days to allow
the governmental entity to amend the rule or ordinance in accordance
with the opinion of the court or to institute a proceeding under the
Code to pay compensation. 10 5
104. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON METROPOLITAN & REGIONAL AREAS,
LAND USE & DEVELOPMENT PLANNING LAW § 108 (1970) (prepared with the coopera-
tion of the New York State Office of Planning Coordination). The last sentence of
the section appears to have been intended to assure that traditional regulatory measures
directed against noxious uses would not be considered a taking. See, e.g., Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 293 U.S. 394
(1915). Whether it does so with sufficient clarity and consistency with existing case
law as to what constitutes a taking is doubtful. Presumably the intended distinction is
between those regulations which are intended to adjust among existing conflicting uses
of land and those intended to implement planned allocations of future land use. The
distinction, however, is elusive and illusory, at least under some circumstances. Cf.
Michelman, infra note 113, at 1196-1201, 1243-44.
105. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 9-111 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971); cf.
A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 1, at 373-74, advocating "relief framed in the alterna-
tive so as to afford the governmental agency an opportunity to decide whether to per-
sist in its regulatory program (and pay just compensation as the price for doing so)
or to rescind its action in whole or in part (subject to attendant equitable adjustment
in its duty to make compensation)," and the authorization of courts "to defer the
effectiveness of a judgment, pending possible legislative modifications, and to retain
jurisdiction to modify the relief sought in the event that the regulation is changed or
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It will be noted that, in its conditional character, the remedy
provided for by these legislative proposals differs importantly from that
granted by the courts in the Bydlon and Lomarch cases.1 0 A condi-
tional remedy, invalidating the regulatory restriction if within a speci-
fied time the responsible governmental entity has not paid or under-
taken to pay just compensation, would meet most of the objections
noted above to a judgment allowing the original regulation to stand
but awarding compensation for the damage to property. It would re-
duce the inhibiting effect upon enactment of innovative legislation
and would leave the ultimate decision whether or not to take and pay
for the acquired property interests to the legislative or administrative
body responsible for the program in question. It would, in some cases,
afford the additional advantage of allowing that body to make the de-
cision in the light of a judicial determination not only of the invalidity
of the attempted regulatory measure, but also of the cost of the measure
if pursued by exercise of the power of eminent domain-at least as to
repealed so that it no longer effectuates a 'taking' or 'damaging.'" The Douglas Com-
mission has recommended an alternative technique which, though probably less polit-
ically acceptable at present, offers substantial advantages over inverse condemnation of
regulatory easements.
The Commission recommends that the States enact legislation enabling prop-
erty-owners to compel the purchase of property rights by regulating govern-
ments when regulations (or certain types of regulations specified by the statute)
would constitute an unconstitutional "taking" of property without just com-
pensation. Land so purchased would then be placed in a public reserve of
urban land for present or future disposal and use in accordance with approved
plans.
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(1968). The Commission explains:
Measures to compensate landowners on the basis of actual loss resulting from
public action would, in many situations, impose administrative difficulties.
Problems arise both in the determination of which reductions are compensable
and which are not.
While it would be possible under such a system to pay the owner for
only that part of his property's value which is lost because of the regulation,
leaving him with full title, it would generally be preferable to purchase the
property itself. The owner would be required to choose between some un-
compensated reduction in value or complete sale of the property-a choice
which would undoubtedly limit the number of owner-initiated actions while
at the same time providing fair treatment for the owner who is seriously
damaged. Moreover, such an approach would eliminate the possibility of wind-
falls to the owner who receives some compensation, retains the property, and
later is able to have the regulation changed. Indeed, partial compensation
might encourage an owner to hold the land out for speculative purposes by
covering his holding cost for a substantial period of time.
Id.
106. See notes 99-100 supra & accompanying text.
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those owners party to the litigation. Planning would thus be enhanced,
not impaired. Furthermore, as already noted, the legislative or admin-
istrative body could consider a full range of alternatives and establish
a relatively comprehensive program, providing for all of the properties
affected and for subsequent alteration or release of whatever interests
were determined to be necessary to accomplish the legislative objec-
tive. As compared to simple nullification of the regulation, a condi-
tional remedy would avoid the lapse in the effectiveness of the regula-
tion, which necessarily occurs under the present procedure between
judicial nullification of the regulations and the legislative decision to
enact an amended regulation, to authorize expropriation, or simply
to, abandon the matter.
As discussed above, the New York courts have already developed
a conditional remedy of this sort in inverse condemnation cases arising
out of physical interference with property by reason of the construc-
tion or operation of a public improvement by a public entity other
than the state itself.10 7 Could an analogous remedy be employed in
police power cases? Keystone 1108 casts doubt on the power of govern-
ment, consistent with the due process and just compensation clauses,
to restrict the development of property pending 'a determination
whether or not to expropriate it-even for so short a time as 180 days.
Absent assurance of compensation for the temporary restriction pend-
ing a legislative or administrative decision as to expropriation, it would
seem equally doubtful, therefore, whether the court could further
delay the free use of the property upon holding a restriction invalid.
The obstacle raised by Keystone I, however, could be cleared by adap-
tation of Keystone II. The wisdom of recognizing a claim to tem-
porary damages for an unconstitutional restriction of property has
been questioned above. But if such a claim is to be recognized, it
should be prosecuted in the same action brought to test the constitu-
tionality of the restriction. In many cases, proof of the impact of the
restriction on the value of the property will be necessary to a deter-
mination of the constitutional question. 0 9 Even apart from the ques-
107. Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936). As
noted, the same remedy has been extended to entirely private disputes. E.g., Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
108. 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
109. E.g., Westwood Forest Estates v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244
N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d
897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968); Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 244
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tion of a conditional remedy, it is preferable to avoid a duplication
of actions. In an action for both a declaration of the invalidity of the
regulation and temporary damages to the date of judgment, the court
could grant a conditional order precisely analogous to the order of
inverse condemnation traditionally granted in physical improvement
cases. 110 There would seem to be no reason, moreover, why the terms
of the condition could not be framed more flexibly, so as to allow the
appropriate legislative or administrative body to choose among a vari-
ety of alternatives including amendment of the restriction.'
If the rationale of Keystone II were to be extended to all police
power restrictions, not just those imposed with a view to expropria-
tion of the property-and we have noted serious objections to so ex-
tending it-it would be but a short step to the development of a
remedy in inverse condemnation that would allow an otherwise uncon-
stitutional regulatory restriction of private property to be sustained
upon provision for compensation while leaving to the appropriate leg-
islative or administrative body the decision whether or not to maintain
the restriction at the cost of compensation. It should be noted, how-
ever, that by reason of the division of jurisdiction between the su-
preme court and the court of claims in respect to actions and proceed-
ings against the state and its officers and agencies, legislation would be
required to enable all issues to be determined and a practicable in-
verse condemnation remedy to be fashioned in a single action.1 12
IV. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION OF A TAKING
The term "inverse condemnation" describes a remedy which is
available only upon a finding that property has been "taken" within
the meaning of the Constitution. A number of cases have been dis-
cussed in this article in which it was necessary for the court to deter-
mine whether particular governmental actions constituted a taking.
N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966); cf. Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197,
5 N.E.2d 198 (1936).
110. To provide temporary damages for the continued period pending a legislative
or administrative decision as to permanent expropriation, it might be necessary to grant
a conditional order only at the request of the public entity, recognizing liability for
such continuing temporary damages.
111. See note 103 supra.
112. Cf. Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority, 9 N.Y.2d 486, 174 N.E.2d
727, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961) (Keystone I and Keystone II are to the same effect).
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In reviewing the Clement case, in which the New York Court of Ap-
peals sought to formulate a clear and workable definition of what
constitutes a de facto taking, it was contended that the definition
reached by the court does not accord with existing case law and raises
more questions than it answers. More generally, courts have been grap-
pling with the issue for decades and have been unable to develop
either a satisfactory theoretical framework of analysis or a consistent
pattern of results. 1 3 Since an answer to the fundamental question of
what is a taking would define a cause of action for inverse condemna-
tion, it may be appropriate to address that question directly, if briefly,
before concluding. Would it be possible-without begging the ques-
tion by reference to undefined concepts of property, due process, tak-
ing, or just compensation-to formulate a workable definition, or at
least a coherent set of rules, principles, standards, or criteria? It does
not seem so.
Previous judicial and scholarly efforts to formulate a test have
been thoroughly analyzed by Professor Michelman," 4 and it would
be entirely redundant to attempt to review those efforts here. Suffice
it to say that the present writer is convinced by Michelman's analysis
that while some of the tests and theories previously advanced illumi-
nate important aspects of the problem, none provides a complete and
satisfactory guide to either the judicial decisions or the basic ethical
and political elements of the issue. Michelman's own analysis of the
problem is in terms of principles of utility and fairness. He points out
that for a given public action to be justified at all its aggregate social
benefits must outweigh its aggregate social costs, public and private.
(Hence a balancing test may be relevant to a determination whether
the action should be taken at all, but not to a determination whether
private costs should be publicly compensated.) If costs are imposed
upon private property in order to realize a greater public benefit, the
only reason not to compensate the owner is the sheer practical im-
possibility of doing so in every case. Proceeding from this point,
Michelman formulates a test first in terms of utility and then in terms
of fairness.
113. See A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 1; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fair-
ness, 80 iIrv. L. Mv: 1165- (1967); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra
note 88; Sax, supra note 55; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L.J. 149 (1971) ; Dunham, supra note 53.
114. Michelman, supra note 113.
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His utilitarian test of compensability is that "compensation is due
whenever demoralization costs exceed settlement costs, and not other-
wise."' " 5 "Demoralization costs" are those arising by reason of the
capricious redistribution of wealth that would normally arise from
public action intended to serve some public end other than redistribu-
tion. They are defined as
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which
accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realiza-
tion that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized
dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired in-
centives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated
losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the
thought that they themselves may be subject to similar treatment on
some other occasion.116
"Settlement costs" are "measured by the dollar value of the time, ef-
fort and resources which would be required in order to reach com-
pensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs."
117
Michelman's fairness test is based upon Rawls' conception of jus-
tice as fairness'18 and states: "A decision not to compensate is not un-
fair as long as the disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate
how such decisions might fit into a consistent practice which holds
forth a lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any con-
sistent practice which is naturally suggested by the opposite deci-
sion.""i 9 The risks to be considered are identified as follows:
The risk associated with the more stringent compensation practice
is that its settlement costs will force abandonment of efficient projects.
Opportunities to augment social output will, then, be missed, and
this is matter of concern to our claimant because, no matter what
distributional pattern eventuates, if there is more to be shared he
stands to get more. The risk associated with the less stringent com-
pensation practice is that of sustaining concentrated losses from effi-
ciency-motivated social projects which otherwise would not have been
sustained-losses which may partially or totally exclude their bearer
from sharing in the general gains from social activity.'20
115. Id. at 1215.
116. Id. at 1214.
117. Id.
118. Michelman relied on Rawl's essays, rather than his later book, J. RAwLs,
A TnEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
119. Michelman, supra note 113, at 1223.
120. Id. at 1222.
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Although Michelman considers fairness the only appropriate ulti-
mate standard for determining the question of compensability, he does
not offer it as a formula for judicial decision making. Fairness, he says,
"resists being cast into a simple, impersonal, easily stated formula' 2 1
and the fairness principle is so general "that it effectively prevents
courts from proceeding by the use of categories and presumptions."' 22
Accordingly, he advocates placing greater responsibility upon legisla-
tive and administrative agencies to achieve fairness.
If utility and fairness are the ultimate standards of compensabil-
ity, and if these are too general and too subtle to be capable of trans-
lation into rules of judicial 'decision, then a coherent test of what
constitutes a de facto taking is impossible for that reason alone. It is
submitted, however, that there is a more fundamental reason. The
reason is that, even in terms of such basic concepts as utility and fair-
ness, the outcome of a taking inquiry necessarily depends upon the
content of current expectations about government and property. Such
expectations are the product of historical experience and tend to be
expressed in complex doctrines and practices of property that have
evolved in response to particular social conditions,2 3 and are not
amenable to synthesis in terms of a coherent set of empirically-di-
rected, general propositions. And if current expectations are an essen-
tial element of the problem, there can be no test that goes behind
them.
Michelman's utilitarian test plainly depends upon current expec-
tations as to property rights, since expectation is an obvious element
in the demoralization variable. 124 Though less obvious, the element
of expectation also appears to be critical in the application of Michel-
man's fairness test. For the fairness test requires consideration not just
of the circumstances of the particular case, but of how the decision
not to compensate "might fit into a consistent practice"; and this, of
course, necessarily implies general rules, principles, or policies which
121. Id. at 1250.
122. Id. at 1247.
123. In Heyert v. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d
263, 271 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1966), for example, the crucial fact was that the adjacent
owner held title in the underlying fee to the center of the highway. See also Roberts v.
City of New York, 295 U.S. 264 (1935); Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536(1907).
124. "Settlement costs" may also depend in part on the strength and specificity
of expectations, especially to the extent that they are separately valued in the market
or permit of clear distinction from less definite expectations.
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define legitimate expectations. Moreover, underlying any compensa-
tion practice is a more fundamental policy as to what expectations
will be recognized by government. If property rights are seen as gov-
ernmentally-sanctioned expectations, then the risk arising from a re-
fusal to recognize particular expectations is deeper and broader than
the simple risk that certain types of social projects will result in dis-
proportionate losses to the owner in excess of any gain he may realize
from a higher standard of general welfare.1 25 The risk will extend,
however slightly, to the entire system of expectations embodied in
the legal order.
If the issue of compensability depends upon expectations and if
expectations are the product of past governmental rules, principles,
and policies, there can be no escape from circularity. Those rules,
principles, and policies are to an extent open-ended. Everyone recog-
nizes that government can legitimately impose upon property certain
kinds of unique or disproportionate costs without compensation; and
everyone recognizes that government has some latitude in extending
or modifying those kinds of costs as new conditions emerge. But there
are also deeply imbedded, though ill-defined, expectations as to how
far and in what ways government may defeat more specific expecta-
tions. These tend to be framed in terms of broad concepts of prop-
erty, taking, due process, just compensation, and the like, which in-
corporate the more specific expectations by reference to highly par-
ticular and incomplete practices and doctrines of property and
constitutional law. Thus there can be no alternative to resolution of
the taking question in terms of particular issues, as they emerge from
processes of political and legal change. This is not to say that the
task must be left primarily to the courts, 2 but only that a compre-
hensive and workable definition of a taking is impossible.
125. Cf. Fried, Two Concepts of Interest, 76 HARV. L. Rav. 755 (1963); Rawls,
Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3 (1955). Perhaps Michelman's criti-
cism of Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), could be met by examining the
case not so much in terms of its specific circumstances as in terms of more general,
well-established doctrines of nuisance and the police power. It is traditional nuisance
doctrine, for example, that although the character of the neighborhood and priority of
occupation are to be considered in determining what constitutes an unreasonable inter-
ference with the use of another's property, the fact that a particular use was established
first does not assure that it will not be found a nuisance by reason of subsequent uses
of nearby properties and, more specifically, that heavy emissions of gas and dust may
be enjoined even though initiated long before the other land uses with which they
interfere. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TO'RTS § 91 (4th ed. 1971).
126. See Michelman, supra note 113, at 1245-58.
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CONCLUSION
In cases of a de facto taking by consequence of the construction
or operation of a public improvement, the New York courts have
developed sound and workable concepts and remedies. Where the
taking is by the state itself, a claim may be prosecuted in the court
of claims for a de facto appropriation. Certain minor issues such as
distinguishing between trespass and appropriation for a variety of
procedural purposes remain to be resolved. And where the taking is
by a corporate agency of the state, some issues remain open by reason
of certain vestiges of sovereign immunity. If the defendant is a
municipality or a private corporation vested with the power of
eminent domain, the court will issue an order of inverse condemna-
tion, granting injunctive relief only if within a specified time the
defendant has not undertaken to compensate the plaintiff for the
property rights taken. This remedy has recently been made available
also to private entities not possessing the power of eminent domain.
In police power cases, the court of appeals has recently recog-
nized a cause of action for temporary damages resulting from an
invalid restriction imposed with a view to subsequent expropriation
of the property. This decision is questionable on grounds of both
policy and precedent and should not be extended to other types of
police power restriction, such as land-use and environmental con-
trols. To so extend the cause of action -would be to inhibit both
legislative enactment of new forms of regulation to meet urgent pub-
lic needs and prompt action to challenge constitutionally suspect
legislation. It would also give rise to confusion and arbitrary distinc-
tions between judicial nullification of the restriction on constitutional
grounds and on closely related but non-constitutional grounds, and
would place pressure on all branches of government to interpose
statutory standards and administrative procedures between the con-
stitution and the application of the statute to any particular property.
In terms of political policy, the beneficiaries of such an unprecedented
cause of action, as compared to other groups adversely affected by the
total effect of governmental policies and actions, would not seem to
have a persuasive claim on public funds.
If, however, a cause of action were to be recognized for tem-
porary damages for a regulatory restriction of property held to be
constitutionally invalid as a taking, it would be but a short pro-
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cedural step to provide a flexible inverse condemnation remedy for
police power cases, analogous to that already developed by the courts
in physical improvement cases, leaving to the appropriate legislative
body or administrative agency the decision whether to rescind or
amend the regulation or to maintain it and provide compensation to
affected property owners.
Finally, since the question depends ultimately upon reasonable
expectations based on past principles and practices, there appears to
be no possibility of an integrated, empirically directed, workable
definition of what constitutes a taking and no alternative to delinea-
tion on an issue-by-issue basis as new problems emerge.
